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Abstract
An extension of an abstract argumentation
framework, called collective argumentation,
is introduced in which the attack relation
is defined directly among sets of arguments.
The extension turns out to be suitable, in
particular, for representing semantics of dis-
junctive logic programs. Two special kinds
of collective argumentation are considered in
which the opponents can share their argu-
ments.
Introduction
The general argumentation theory
[Bondarenko et al., 1997, Dung, 1995b] has proved to
be a powerful framework for representing nonmono-
tonic formalisms in general, and semantics for normal
logic programs, in particular. Thus, it has been shown
that the main semantics for the latter, suggested in the
literature, are naturally representable in this frame-
work (see, e.g., [Dung, 1995a, Kakas and Toni, 1999]).
In this report we suggest a certain extension of the
general argumentation theory in which the attack re-
lation is defined directly among sets of arguments. In
other words, we will permit situations in which a set
of arguments ‘collectively’ attacks another set of argu-
ments in a way that is not reducible to attacks among
particular arguments from these sets. It turns out
that this extension is suitable for providing semantics
for disjunctive logic programs in which the rules have
multiple heads. In addition, it suggests a natural set-
ting for studying kinds of argumentation in which the
opponents could provisionally share their arguments.
Moreover, the original argumentation theory can be
‘reconstructed’ in this framework by requiring, in ad-
dition, that the attack relation should be local in the
sense that a set of arguments can attack another set
of arguments only if it attacks a particular argument
in this set.
The plan of the paper is as follows. After a brief de-
scription of the abstract argumentation theory, we sug-
gest its generalization in which the attack relation is
defined on sets of arguments. It is shown that the
suggested collective argumentation theory is adequate
for representing practically any semantics for disjunc-
tive logic programs. As an application of the general
theory, we consider two special cases of the general
framework in which the opponents can share their ar-
guments. The semantics obtained in this way will cor-
respond to some familiar proposals, given in the liter-
ature.
1 Abstract Argumentation Theory
We give first a brief description of the argumentation
theory from [Dung, 1995b].
Definition 1.1. An abstract argumentation theory is
a pair 〈A, →֒〉, where A is a set of arguments , while →֒
a binary relation of an attack on A.
A general task of the argumentation theory consists
in determining ‘good’ sets of arguments that are safe
in some sense with respect to the attack relation. To
this end, we should extend first the attack relation to
sets of arguments: if Γ, ∆ are sets of arguments, then
Γ →֒∆ is taken to hold iff α →֒β, for some α ∈ Γ,
β ∈ ∆.
An argument α will be called allowable for the set
of arguments Γ, if Γ does not attack α. For any set
of arguments Γ, we will denote by [Γ] the set of all
arguments allowable by Γ, that is
[Γ] = {α | Γ 6֒→α}
An argument α will be called acceptable for the set of
arguments Γ, if Γ attacks any argument against α. As
can be easily checked, the set of arguments that are
acceptable for Γ coincides with [[Γ]].
Using the above notions, we can give a quite simple
characterization of the basic objects of an abstract ar-
gumentation theory.
Definition 1.2. A set of arguments Γ will be called
• conflict-free if Γ ⊆ [Γ];
• admissible if it is conflict-free and Γ ⊆ [[Γ]];
• a complete extension if it is conflict-free and Γ =
[[Γ]];
• a preferred extension if it is a maximal complete
extension;
• a stable extension if Γ = [Γ].
A set of arguments Γ is conflict-free if it does not at-
tack itself. A conflict-free set Γ is admissible iff any
argument from Γ is also acceptable for Γ, and it is a
complete extension if it coincides with the set of ar-
guments that are acceptable with respect to it. Fi-
nally, a stable extension is a conflict-free set of argu-
ments that attacks any argument outside it. Clearly,
any stable extension is also a preferred extension, any
preferred extension is a complete extension, and any
complete extension is an admissible set. Moreover, as
has been shown in [Dung, 1995b], any admissible set
is included in some complete extension. Consequently,
preferred extensions coincide with maximal admissible
sets. In addition, the set of complete extensions forms
a complete lower semi-lattice: for any set of complete
extensions, there exists a unique greatest complete ex-
tension that is included in all of them. In particular,
there always exists a least complete extension of an
argumentation theory.
As has been shown in [Dung, 1995a], under a suit-
able translation, the above objects correspond to well-
known semantics suggested for normal logic programs.
Thus, stable extensions correspond to stable models
(answer sets), complete extensions correspond to par-
tial stable models, preferred extensions correspond to
regular models, while the least complete extension cor-
responds in this sense to the well-founded semantics
(WFS). These results have shown, in effect, that the
abstract argumentation theory successfully captures
the essence of logical reasoning behind normal logic
programs.
Unfortunately, the above argumentation theory can-
not be extended directly to disjunctive logic programs.
The reasons for this shortcoming, as well as a way of
modifying the argumentation theory are discussed in
the next section.
2 Collective Argumentation
We begin with pointing out a peculiar discrepancy
between the abstract argumentation theory, on the
one hand, and the general abductive framework used
for interpreting semantics for logic programs, on
the other hand (see, e.g., [Bondarenko et al., 1997,
Dung, 1995a, Kakas and Toni, 1999]). The main ob-
jects of the abductive argumentation theory are sets of
assumptions (abducibles) of the form not p that play
the role of arguments in the associated argumentation
theory. In addition, the attack relation is defined in
this framework as a relation between sets of abducibles
and particular abducibles they attack. For example,
the program rule r ← not p,not q is interpreted as
saying that the set of assumptions {not p,not q} at-
tacks the assumption not r.
The above attack relation is employed for defining the
basic objects (such as extensions) of the source abduc-
tive framework. The abstract argumentation theory
defines its main objects, however, as sets of arguments.
Consequently, they should correspond to sets of sets of
assumptions in the abductive framework. The abduc-
tive theory defines such objects, however, as certain
plain sets of assumptions! In other words, we have a
certain discrepancy between the levels of representa-
tions of intended objects in these two theories.
The above discrepancy will disappear once we notice
that all the basic objects of the abstract argumentation
theory are definable, in effect, in terms of the derived
attack relation Γ →֒α between sets of arguments and
particular arguments; only the latter was used in defin-
ing the above operator [Γ]. As a result, the abductive
argumentation theory can be constructed in the same
way as the abstract theory, with the only distinction
that the attack relation between sets of arguments and
particular arguments is not reducible to the attack re-
lation among individual arguments.
The above construction of abductive argumentation
naturally suggests that assumptions, or abducibles,
can be considered as full-fledged arguments, while the
attack relation is best describable as a relation among
sets of arguments. Indeed, once we allow for a possi-
bility that a set of arguments can produce a nontrivial
attack that is not reducible to attacks among partic-
ular arguments, it is only natural to allow also for a
possibility that a set of arguments could be attacked
in such a way that we cannot single out a particular
argument in the attacked set that could be blamed
for it. In a quite common case, for example, we can
disprove some conclusion jointly supported by the dis-
puted set of arguments. The following generalization
of the abstract argumentation framework reflects this
idea.
Definition 2.1. A collective argumentation theory is
a pair 〈A, →֒〉, where A is a set of arguments, and →֒
is an attack relation on finite subsets of A satisfying
the following monotonicity condition:
(Monotonicity) If Γ →֒∆, then Γ∪Γ′ →֒∆∪∆′.
Though the attack relation is defined above only on
finite sets of arguments, it can be naturally extended
to arbitrary such sets by imposing the following com-
pactness property:
(Compactness) Γ →֒∆ only if Γ′ →֒∆′, for some
finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ, ∆′ ⊆ ∆.
As the reader may notice, the suggested argumenta-
tion framework has many properties in common with
ordinary sequent calculus, or consequence relations.
Moreover, we will use in what follows the same agree-
ments for the attack relation as that commonly ac-
cepted for consequence relations. Thus, Γ,Γ1 →֒∆,∆1
will have the same meaning as Γ∪Γ1 →֒∆∪∆1. Sim-
ilarly, α,Γ →֒∆, β will be an alternative notation for
{α} ∪ Γ →֒{β} ∪∆, etc.
The argumentation theory from [Dung, 1995a] sat-
isfies all the above properties. Moreover, the
above modification of the abstract argumentation
theory has already been suggested, in effect, in
[Kakas and Toni, 1999]. However, the attack relation
defined in the latter paper satisfied also a couple of fur-
ther properties described in the following definition.
Definition 2.2. A collective argumentation theory
will be called
• affirmative if no set of arguments attacks the
empty set ∅;
• local if it satisfies the following condition:
(Locality) If Γ →֒∆,∆′, then either Γ →֒∆
or Γ →֒∆′.
• normal if it is both affirmative and local.
If a collective argumentation theory is normal, then it
can be easily shown that Γ →֒∆ will hold if and only
if Γ →֒α, for some α ∈ ∆. Consequently, the attack
relation in such argumentation theories is reducible to
the relation Γ →֒α between sets of arguments and sin-
gle arguments, and the resulting argumentation the-
ory will coincide, in effect, with that given already in
[Dung, 1995a].
It turns out, however, that the general, non-local
framework of collective argumentation is precisely
what is needed in order to represent semantics of dis-
junctive logic programs.
2.1 Collective Argumentation and
Disjunctive Programs
Despite an obvious success, the abstract argumenta-
tion theory is still not abundant with intuitions and
principles that could guide its development indepen-
dently of applications. In this respect, logic program-
ming and its semantics constitute one of the crucial
sources and driving forces behind development of ar-
gumentation theories. Consequently, as a first step
in studying collective argumentation, we consider its
representation capabilities in describing semantics for
disjunctive logic programs.
In what follows, given a set of propositional atoms C,
we will denote by C the complement of C in the set of
all atoms. In addition, notC will denote the set of all
negative literals (abducibles) not p, for p ∈ C.
By the general correspondence between normal logic
programs and abductive argumentation frameworks, a
set of abducibles notC attacks an abducible not p in
the abductive theory associated with a normal logic
program P if P , taken together with notC as a set of
additional assumptions, allows to derive p.
The above description immediately suggests a gener-
alization according to which any disjunctive logic pro-
gram P determines an attack relation among sets of
abducibles as follows:
notC attacks notD iff P ∪ notC derives
∨
D.
As can be easily verified, the above defined attack re-
lation satisfies all the properties of collective argumen-
tation. However, it is in general not local: P ∪ notC
may support p ∨ q without supporting either p or q.
Still, it will be affirmative for disjunctive logic pro-
grams without constraints.
The appropriateness of the original argumentation the-
ory for representing semantics of normal logic pro-
grams was based, ultimately, on the fact that these
semantics are completely determined by rules of the
form p← notC that are derivable from a program. A
similar principle, called the principle of partial deduc-
tion, or evaluation is valid also for the majority of se-
mantics suggested for disjunctive logic programs. Ac-
cording to this principle, semantics of such programs
should be completely determined by rules C ← notD
without positive atoms in bodies that are derivable
from the source program. See also [Bochman, 1998]
for the role of this principle in determining semantics
of logic programs of a most general kind.
The above considerations indicate that practically
all ‘respectable’ semantics for disjunctive programs
should be expressible in terms of collective argumen-
tation theories associated with such programs.
It turns out, however, that the actual semantics sug-
gested for disjunctive programs do not fit easily into
the general constructions of Dung’s argumentation
theory. A most immediate reason for this is that the
operator [Γ] of the abstract argumentation theory is no
longer suitable for capturing the main content of the
collective attack relation, since the latter is defined
as holding between sets of arguments. Accordingly, it
seems reasonable to generalize it to an operator that
outputs a set of sets of arguments:
〈Γ〉 = {∆ | Γ 6֒→∆}
As in the abstract argumentation theory, 〈Γ〉 will col-
lect argument sets that are allowable with respect to
Γ. Notice that, due to monotonicity of the attack re-
lation, 〈Γ〉 will be closed with respect to subsets, that
is, if ∆ ∈ 〈Γ〉 and Φ ⊆ ∆, then Φ ∈ 〈Γ〉. Conse-
quently, any set 〈Γ〉 will be completely determined by
maximal argument sets belonging to it. As can be eas-
ily verified, such maximal sets will always exist due to
compactness of the attack relation.
2.2 Stable and Partial Stable Argument Sets
Using the above generalized operator of allowa-
bility, we can give a rather simple description
of stable and partial stable models for disjunc-
tive programs (see, e.g., [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991,
Przymusinski, 1991]) in terms of collective argumen-
tation.
Definition 2.3. • A set of arguments Γ will be said
to be stable with respect to a collective argumen-
tation theory if it is a maximal set in 〈Γ〉.
• A pair of sets (Γ,∆) will be called p-stable if Γ ⊆
∆, Γ is a maximal set in 〈∆〉, and ∆ is a maximal
set in 〈Γ〉.
The following lemmas give more direct, and often more
convenient, descriptions of the above objects. The
proofs are immediate, so we omit them.
Lemma 2.1. Γ is a stable set iff Γ = {α | Γ 6֒→Γ, α}.
The above equation says that a stable set is a set Γ
consisting of all arguments α such that Γ does not
attack Γ∪ {α}. A similar description can be given for
partial stable sets:
Lemma 2.2. (Γ,∆) is p-stable iff Γ ⊆ ∆, ∆ = {α |
Γ 6֒→∆, α}, and Γ = {α | ∆ 6֒→Γ, α}.
Recall that normal collective argumentation theories
could be identified with abstract Dung’s argumenta-
tion theories. Moreover, the above descriptions can be
used to show that if a collective argumentation theory
is normal, then stable argument sets will coincide with
stable extensions, while p-stable pairs will correspond
exactly to complete extensions of the abstract argu-
mentation theory. These facts could also be obtained
as a by-product of the correspondence between such
objects and relevant semantics of disjunctive programs
stated below.
The correspondence between the above descriptions
and (partial) stable models of disjunctive logic pro-
grams is established in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3. If AP is a collective argumentation
theory corresponding to a disjunctive program P , then
• C is a stable model of P iff notC is a stable set
in AP .
• (C,D) is a p-stable model of P iff (notC,notD)
is p-stable in AP .
P-stable models have been introduced in
[Bochman, 1998] as a slight modification of Przy-
musinski’s partial stable models for disjunctive
programs from [Przymusinski, 1991]; the reason for
the modification was that the original Przymusinski’s
semantics violated the above-mentioned principle
of partial deduction. In our present context, this
means that it is not definable directly in terms of
the collective argumentation theory associated with
a disjunctive program. Note, however, that the
modification does not change the correspondence with
partial stable models for normal logic programs.
The above results could serve as an instance of our ear-
lier claim that semantics of disjunctive programs are
representable in the framework of collective argumen-
tation. These results reveal, however, that the relevant
objects are significantly different from the correspond-
ing objects of the abstract argumentation theory. In
order to get a further insight on the differences, we
will consider now various notions of admissibility for
argument sets that are definable in the framework of
collective argumentation.
2.3 Argument sharing
In ordinary disputation and argumentation the par-
ties can provisionally accept some of the arguments
defended by their adversaries in order to disprove the
latter. Two basic cases of such an ‘argument sharing’
in attacking the opponents are described in the follow-
ing definition (see also [Bondarenko et al., 1997]).
Definition 2.4. • Γ positively attacks ∆ (notation
Γ →֒+∆) if Γ,∆ →֒∆;
• Γ negatively attacks ∆ (notation Γ →֒−∆) if
Γ →֒Γ,∆.
In a positive attack, the proponent temporarily ac-
cepts opponent’s arguments in order to disprove the
latter, while in a negative attack she shows that her
arguments are sufficient for challenging an addition of
opponent’s arguments. Clearly, if Γ attacks ∆ directly,
then it attacks the latter both positively and nega-
tively. The reverse implications do not hold, however.
Note that the above defined notion of a stable argu-
ment set was formulated, in effect, in terms of negative
attacks. Indeed, it is easy to see that a set Γ is stable
iff it negatively attacks any argument outside it:
Γ = {α | Γ 6֒→− α}
As can be seen, the above definition is equivalent to
the definition of stable extensions in the abstract ar-
gumentation theory, given earlier, so stable extensions
and stable sets of collective argumentation are indeed
close relatives.
Recall now that admissible argument sets in Dung’s ar-
gumentation theory are definable as conflict-free sets
that counterattack any argument against them. Given
the above proliferation of the notion of an attack in col-
lective argumentation, however, we can obtain a num-
ber of possible definitions of admissibility by allowing
different kinds of attack and/or counterattack among
sets of arguments. Three such notions turns out to be
of special interest.
Definition 2.5. A conflict-free set of arguments Γ
will be called
• admissible if Γ →֒∆ whenever ∆ →֒Γ;
• positively admissible if Γ →֒+∆ whenever
∆ →֒+ Γ;
• negatively admissible if Γ →֒−∆ whenever
∆ →֒− Γ.
Plain admissibility is a direct counterpart of the corre-
sponding notion from the abstract argumentation the-
ory. Unfortunately, in the context of collective argu-
mentation it lacks practically all the properties it has
in the latter. Notice, in particular, that stable sets as
defined above need not be admissible in this sense.
As can be seen, positive and negative admissibility
coincide with plain admissibility for respective ‘ex-
tended’ attack relations. The latter have some specific
features that make the overall structure simpler and
more regular. They will be described in the following
sections.
3 Negative Argumentation
The definition below provides a general description of
collective argumentation based on a negative attack.
Such argumentation theories will be shown to be es-
pecially suitable for studying stable argument sets.
Definition 3.1. A collective argumentation theory
will be called negative if Γ →֒Γ,∆ always implies
Γ →֒∆.
As can be easily verified, any collective argumentation
theory will be negative with respect to the negative
attack relation →֒−. Moreover, the latter determines
a least negative ‘closure’ of the source attack relation.
The following result gives an important alternative
characterization of negative argumentation; it estab-
lishes a correspondence between negative argumenta-
tion and shift operations studied in a number of papers
on disjunctive logic programming [Dix et al., 1994,
Schaerf, 1995, You et al., 2000].
Lemma 3.1. An argumentation theory is negative iff
it satisfies:
(Importation) If Γ →֒∆,Φ, then Γ,∆ →֒Φ.
Proof. If the argumentation theory is negative and
Γ →֒∆,Φ, then Γ,∆ →֒Γ,∆,Φ by monotonicity, and
hence Γ,∆ →֒Φ. The reverse implication is immedi-
ate.
As an important special case of Importation, we have
that if Γ →֒∆, then Γ,∆ →֒ ∅. Thus, any nontriv-
ial negative argumentation theory is bound to be
non-affirmative. Furthermore, this implies that self-
contradictory arguments attack any argument:
If ∆ →֒∆, then ∆ →֒Γ
These ‘classical’ properties indicate that negative at-
tack is similar to a rule A ⊢ ¬B holding in a supra-
classical consequence relation. Though the latter does
not admit contraposition, we nevertheless have that if
A ⊢ ¬(B ∧ C), then A,B ⊢ ¬C.
The connection between negative argumentation and
stable argument sets is based on the following facts
about general collective argumentation.
Theorem 3.2. 1. If Γ is negatively admissible, and
∆ is a conflict-free set that includes Γ, then ∆ is
also negatively admissible.
2. Stable sets coincide with maximal negatively ad-
missible sets.
Proof. (1) Assume that Γ is negatively admissible,
Γ ⊆ ∆ and Φ →֒−∆. Then Φ →֒−∆,Γ, and hence
Φ,∆ →֒− Γ by Importation. Since Γ is negatively ad-
missible, we obtain Γ →֒− Φ,∆, and hence Γ,∆ →֒− Φ
by Importation. But the latter amounts to ∆ →֒− Φ,
which shows that ∆ is also negatively admissible.
(2) It is easy to check that any stable set is negatively
admissible. Moreover, any superset of a stable set will
not already be conflict-free. Consequently stable sets
will be maximal negatively admissible sets. In the
other direction, if Γ is a maximal negatively admissible
set and α /∈ Γ, then Γ ∪ {α} will not be conflict-free
by the previous claim, and hence Γ, α →֒Γ, α. Conse-
quently Γ, α →֒− Γ, and therefore Γ →֒− Γ, α (since Γ is
negatively admissible). But the latter implies Γ →֒− α,
which shows that Γ is actually a stable set.
Recall now that negatively admissible sets are precisely
admissible sets with respect to the negative attack
→֒−. Moreover, in negative argumentation theories
admissible sets will coincide with negatively admissi-
ble ones, while any conflict-free set will already be pos-
itively admissible. Accordingly, all nontrivial kinds of
admissibility in such theories will boil down to (neg-
ative) admissibility; furthermore, maximal admissible
sets in such argumentation theories will coincide with
stable sets.
It can also be easily verified that any collective argu-
mentation theory has the same stable sets as its neg-
ative closure. So, Importation is an admissible rule
for argumentation systems based on stable sets. As a
result, negative argumentation theories suggest them-
selves as a natural framework for describing stable sets.
Though the above results demonstrate that negatively
admissible sets behave much like logically consistent
sets, there is a crucial difference: the empty set ∅
is not, in general, negatively admissible. Moreover,
an argumentation theory may be ‘negatively inconsis-
tent’, that is, it may have no negatively admissible sets
at all; this happens precisely when it has no stable sets.
Unfortunately, the above considerations indicate also
that negative argumentation is inappropriate for
studying argument sets beyond stable ones. Recall
that one of the main incentives for introducing par-
tial stable and well-founded models for normal pro-
grams was the desire to avoid taking stance on each
and every literal and argument. However, negativity
implies that self-contradictory arguments attack any
argument whatsoever, so any admissible set is forced
now to counter-attack any such argument. In partic-
ular, if ∆ →֒Φ, then any admissible set should attack
∆∪Φ. This means that complete extensions (and par-
tial stable models) are no longer a viable alternative
for such argumentation systems. This means as well
that Importation (and corresponding shift operations
in logic programming) is an appropriate operation only
for describing stable models1.
4 Positive Argumentation
The following definition provides a description of ar-
gumentation based on a positive attack.
Definition 4.1. A collective argumentation theory
will be called positive if Γ,∆ →֒∆ always implies
Γ →֒∆.
Any collective argumentation theory will be positive
with respect to the positive attack relation →֒+. More-
over, the latter determines a least positive extension
of the source attack relation.
Example. Consider an argumentation theory contain-
ing only two arguments α and β such that α →֒α and
α →֒β. As can be seen, this argumentation theory has
no extensions, while the corresponding positive theory
has a unique extension {β}.
Similarly to negative argumentation, positive argu-
mentation can be characterized by the ‘exportation’
property described in the lemma below:
Lemma 4.1. An argumentation theory is positive iff
it satisfies:
(Exportation) If Γ,∆ →֒Φ, then Γ →֒∆,Φ.
The above characterization implies, in particular, that
self-conflicting arguments are attacked by any argu-
ment:
If ∆ →֒∆, then Γ →֒∆
So, in positive argumentation we are relieved, in effect,
from the obligation to refute self-contradictory argu-
1despite some attempts made in this direction – see,
e.g., [You et al., 2000]. Actually, the same difficulty
plagues attempts to define partial stable semantics for de-
fault logic.
ments. In particular, no allowable argument will be
self-contradictory.
It is interesting to note that positive and negative ar-
gumentation are, in a sense, incompatible on pain of
trivialization. Namely, if we combine positive and neg-
ative argumentation, we obtain a symmetric attack re-
lation:
Lemma 4.2. If an argumentation theory is both pos-
itive an negative, then α →֒β always implies β →֒α.
Proof. If α →֒β, then α, β →֒α, β by monotonicity.
Consequently, α, β →֒α by negativity and hence β →֒α
by positivity.
In this case we can consider the attack relation α →֒β
as expressing plain incompatibility of the arguments
α and β in a classical logical sense. In other words,
we could treat arguments as propositions and define
α →֒β as α  ¬β.
4.1 Local Positive Argumentation
As a matter of fact, positively admissible
sets were introduced for normal programs
in [Kakas and Mankarella, 1991] (see also
[Kakas and Toni, 1999]) under the name weakly
stable sets ; maximal such sets were termed stable
theories. Accordingly, a study of such objects will
amount to a study of admissible sets in collective
argumentation theories that are positive closures of
normal argumentation theories.
Note first that a positive closure of a local argumen-
tation theory need not, in general, be local. Still, the
following property provides a characterization of posi-
tive theories arising from local argumentation theories.
Definition 4.2. A collective argumentation theory
will be called l-positive if it is positive and satisfies
(Semi-locality) If Γ →֒∆,Φ, then either Γ,∆ →֒Φ
or Γ,Φ →֒∆
The following basic result shows that l-positive argu-
mentation theories are precisely positive closures of lo-
cal theories. Though the proof is not trivial, we omit
it due to the lack of space.
Theorem 4.3. An argumentation theory is l-positive
iff it is a positive closure of some local argumentation
theory.
Due to the above result, stable theories from
[Kakas and Mankarella, 1991] are exactly repre-
sentable as maximal admissible sets in l-positive
argumentation theories. It turns out that many
properties of stable theories can be obtained in this
abstract setting; the corresponding descriptions will
be given in an extended version of this report. Still, we
should mention that, since l-positive argumentation
theories are not local, the corresponding structure
of admissible sets is more complex than in the local
case. For example, the set of admissible sets no longer
forms a lower semi-lattice.
5 Preliminary Conclusions
Collective argumentation suggests itself as a natural
extension of the abstract argumentation theory. It al-
lows, in particular, to represent and study semantics
for disjunctive logic programs. Speaking generally, it
constitutes an argumentation framework in which the
attack relation has structural properties allowing to
represent cooperation and sharing of arguments among
the parties.
The present report is very preliminary, however; it
only barely scratches the surface of the vast number of
problems and issues that arise in this setting. One of
such issues consists in extending the approach to other,
weaker semantics suggested for disjunctive programs.
A more general task amounts, however, to determining
general argumentation principles underlying collective
argumentation. This is a subject of an ongoing re-
search.
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